Drawing on recent work by William Easterly, Casey Lartigue (of the Center for Free Enterprise here in Seoul) has a must-read piece in the Korea Herald this week. In it, Lartigue questions the theory of "benevolent autocrats" and wonders just how much of South Korea's economic rise can be attributed to the dictatorial powers of strongman ruler Park Chung-hee. A sample:
Read the rest here. In addition, here's Easterly discussing his "Benevolent Autocrats" paper on Econtalk.
As readers of this site may recall, this is a topic that is near and dear to my heart. Indeed, I suspect that there's a paper lurking somewhere in my head, if only I'd get turn on the juice and write the damn thing.
For all of their alleged expertise at guiding the economy, Easterly notes that growth rates swing more wildly under autocrats than democrats, and often without radical changes in policy. Growth continues either immediately or within a short time after an autocrat dies suddenly or is assassinated, and that's without a successor waiting-in-the-wings (in South Korea's case, after a short dip, the economy took off after Chun Doo-hwan replaced Park). There are many things going on in a country, from mass movements from the rural to city areas or perhaps the ending of tyranny or civil war. Yet, the "benevolent autocrat" theory highlights one guy when the results are good and blames many factors when there is failure.
Read the rest here. In addition, here's Easterly discussing his "Benevolent Autocrats" paper on Econtalk.
As readers of this site may recall, this is a topic that is near and dear to my heart. Indeed, I suspect that there's a paper lurking somewhere in my head, if only I'd get turn on the juice and write the damn thing.
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