In the times I’ve heard or read Harvard philosopher Michael Sandel, he’s never missed a chance to lament what he calls the “market triumphalism” that has prevailed since – are you sitting down? – the elections of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher in the early 1980s. Moreover, Sandel writes with a note of concern that “Economics [has become] an imperial domain. Today, the logic of buying and selling no longer applies to material goods alone. It increasingly governs the whole of life.”
As it happens, just this past week, Steven Horwitz – a resident of this imperial domain – posted on Facebook what may be the best, if unintended, response to the writings of Michael Sandel that I’ve yet seen. It is certainly among the most succinct. Horwitz writes:
As it happens, just this past week, Steven Horwitz – a resident of this imperial domain – posted on Facebook what may be the best, if unintended, response to the writings of Michael Sandel that I’ve yet seen. It is certainly among the most succinct. Horwitz writes:
Economists are sometimes accused of thinking only in terms of money, but that's dead wrong. We're the ones pointing out that costs are more than just financial. In fact, the best economists are the least "materialist" people around, as we understand that costs and benefits are ultimately subjective and personal. The more you understand economics, the less of a "materialist" you should be.
Just as economists – well, the good ones, at least – take their theorizing beyond the realm of money, so too do markets transcend the lowly bogs of filthy lucre. When libertarians, Austrian economists, and others of a free market persuasion speak of “markets” what they’re really talking about is “voluntarism.” The Market, properly understood, should not be confused with Namdaemun in Seoul or the Grand Bazaar in Istanbul – though these places are certainly a piece of The Market. Rather, The Market refers to the myriad ways in which individuals come together to form cooperative relationships in the absence of coercive force. Sometimes this involves the exchange of money, but quite often it does not.
My first impulse, then, when Sandel writes, in his latest book What Money Can’t Buy: the Moral Limits of Markets, that “we have drifted from having a market economy to a market society,” is to think, great, more voluntary interactions and fewer instances of coercion by outside parties.
But, of course, this is not what Sandel has in mind. For him, The Market is more akin to a large department store where folks can now buy everything from access to better health care, to the right to emit carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, to a spot in the carpool lane on a busy Texas freeway. For Sandel, the fact that such things are for sale at all presents a towering philosophical challenge. He writes:
A debate about the moral limits of markets would enable us to decide, as a society, where markets serve the public good and where they do not belong. Thinking through the appropriate place of markets requires that we reason together, in public, about the right way to value the social goods we prize.
The trouble underlying Sandel’s philosophizing is apparent in the wording of this passage. How, exactly, will “we” have this debate that will help “us” decide where markets belong and how much “we” value these social goods? After all, as Horwitz points out, costs and benefits are subjective and personal, which means that in any such mass debate – say, via democratic elections – one group of individuals will be arrogating to themselves the right to tell other groups what they can and cannot do with their time, money, and bodies. Perhaps some majority (or even plurality) of citizens believe that surrogate motherhood degrades the female. Fine, but by what means and by what right did that majority acquire ownership over the body of any woman who wishes to provide such a service?
It’s worth noting also that the areas in which Sandel appears most concerned about people buying their way into better products and services tend to be precisely those areas where markets are not allowed to function: health care, prisons, traffic and roads, education, and the environment. Sandel thus misdiagnoses the problem. The issue is not that rich people are segregating themselves with their money, but that entrepreneurs – via The Market – are most often prevented from discovering new ways to bring better products and services to those populating the lower rungs of the income ladder.
For millennia, the merchant class – and the commercial activity in which its members wallow – has been viewed with scorn by the academic elite. What these academic scolds fail to do, however, in their condemnation of commerce is suggest a realistic and morally superior alternative to The Market and its voluntary networks of relationships. To read Sandel (and the not dissimilar writings of Robert Frank), then, is to read someone who, to summarize Thomas Sowell, appears to believe that simply because he finds something unpleasant means that there should be a law against that thing, though Sandel stops short of advocating specific policies. How he proposes to limit The Market without trampling on the freedom of individuals to pursue their chosen course in life, however, is not clear.




